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Commentary

SOUTH CAROLINA V. NORTH CAROLINA—
SOME PROBLEMS ARISING IN AN EAST
COAST WATER DISPUTE
Kristin Linsley Myles*
Introduction
In June 2007, South Carolina sought leave from the Supreme Court of the
United States to file an original bill of complaint. South Carolina asserted that
North Carolina was using more than its share of the waters of the Catawba River,
which flows from the Blue Ridge Mountains in North Carolina past Charlotte
and into South Carolina at Lake Wylie. Among other things, South Carolina
claimed that North Carolina had improperly approved inter-basin transfers of
water from the Catawba into other river systems. South Carolina sought an
equitable apportionment of the waters of the Catawba, and an injunction against
further transfers. North Carolina opposed the filing of the complaint on the
ground that the issue of the flow and usage of the Catawba already was the subject
of a proceeding before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on an
application by Duke Energy to renew its fifty-year license for eleven power plants
along the Catawba. Duke’s relicensing application had involved a comprehensive
negotiation among affected constituencies in both states, including state agencies,
environmental groups, water users, and others. In October 2007, the Court
granted South Carolina leave to file its bill of complaint.

* This commentary was written as part of Ms. Myles’ presentation as a panelist during the
ABA’s 19th Section Fall Meeting in Indianapolis, Indiana. The panel addressed the legal challenges
common in interstate water disputes, and how they are adjudicated through the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court of the United States. Ms. Myles addressed an interstate water dispute, South
Carolina v. North Carolina, Orig. No. 138, in which she acted as Special Master for the U.S. Supreme
Court. The record of the proceedings can be found at http://www.mto.com/sm. Ms. Myles is a
litigation partner in the San Francisco office of Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP.
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The South Carolina v. North Carolina dispute was unique in a number of
respects. Most notably, unlike most water disputes that the Court has heard, it did
not involve any pre-existing interstate compact, and both of the states involved
were riparian rights states. Accordingly, there was no pre-ordained benchmark—
such as a regime established by compact or a set of adjudicated rights of prior
appropriation—against which any equitable apportionment might be shaped.
This meant that the equitable apportionment, if the Court were to get to the
point of adjudicating the issue, would have been a “pure” apportionment, based
on usage history, future needs, a weighing of the quality of uses, and other factors.
It necessarily would have entailed an enormous amount of fact-finding, expert
input, and, ultimately, judgment.
In the end, the case settled with the parties agreeing to resolve their disputes
through the pending FERC proceeding. This paper discusses three issues that
arose in the case that raised interesting puzzles and that might provide useful
guidance for future cases: namely, the source of law in original jurisdiction cases,
and in equitable apportionment cases in particular; the role of non-state parties
in such actions; and the availability of bifurcation to streamline the adjudication process.

Nature of Equitable Apportionment Cases
Because South Carolina v. North Carolina was a “pure” equitable apportionment
case, the issue of the source of applicable law arose on more than one occasion.
Without a compact or a set of previously adjudicated state law water rights,
the Court ultimately would have to resolve the dispute based on a balancing of
numerous relevant factors, as a matter of federal common law. But to what extent
would state law play a role in any such resolution? This question arose frequently
in the briefing on intervention and other issues as well.
Some background on the Court’s equitable apportionment jurisprudence is
useful to place this question in context. Early in the Court’s history, it was unclear
whether the grant of original jurisdiction to the Court in Article III, Section 2 also
carried with it the power to make new law. In some of the early disputes between
states, including those involving boundary and water disputes, states challenged
the Court’s power to make law, arguing that the jurisdictional grant gave the
Court original jurisdiction but did not give it the power to make law—a power
that was reserved to Congress.1 The Court ultimately held that the purpose of
the original jurisdiction grant was to allow the Court to resolve disputes between
sovereign states that otherwise, absent such a dispute resolution mechanism,
would be cause for war or interstate treaties. Because the Constitution had
See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 677, 717–18, 720 (1838) (arguing
only Congress has the power to make law and noting the jurisdictional challenge raised by
Massachusetts and the Court’s “limited and special original jurisdiction”).
1
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stripped the states of that aspect of their sovereign power—the power to wage war
and to negotiate treaties—there needed to be a substitute mechanism to allow
disputes to be resolved amicably, in a manner that respected the dignity of each
sovereign state.2 To the extent that such disputes might arise in an area where no
binding law existed to guide the Court, the Court would have to fashion such
law as common law, as a necessary part of its power to resolve the dispute itself.3
The power to do so necessarily was part of the Court’s constitutional power to
resolve disputes between states, even in areas that went beyond the competence
of Congress to makes laws on the subject matter.4 As the Court explained in
Kansas v. Colorado:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states
to each other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands on
the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation
on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own views to
none. Yet, whenever . . . the action of one state reaches, through
the agency of natural laws, into the territory of another state, the
question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two
states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, and
this court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will
recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish
justice between them. In other words, through these successive
disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what
may not improperly be called interstate common law.5
It was against this set of background understandings that the Court developed
its federal common law of equitable apportionment. The Court has held that the
inquiry to determine one state’s rights to the waters of a river over those of another
state is necessarily very broad. Early in the Court’s jurisprudence, it rejected
See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 234,
238 (1901) (quoting Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1900)); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. at 724–27. As the Court explained in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, which presented a
similar issue of judicial lawmaking power in the context of a boundary dispute:
2

Bound hand and foot by the prohibitions of the constitution, a complaining state
can neither treat, agree, or fight with its adversary, without the consent of congress: a
resort to the judicial power is the only means left for legally adjusting, or persuading
a state which has possession of disputed territory, to enter into an agreement or
compact, relating to a controverted boundary. Few, if any, will be made, when it is left
to the pleasure of the state in possession; but when it is known that some tribunal can
decide on the right, it is most probable that controversies will be settled by compact.
37 U.S. at 726.
3

See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 95–98.

See id. at 95 (“It does not follow . . . that because Congress cannot determine the rule which
shall control between the two states . . . the controversy ceases to be one of a justiciable nature.”).
4

5

Id. at 97–98.
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arguments by some states—particularly Colorado—that an upstream state has the
sovereign right to take any and all water that runs through the state.6 The Court
also rejected equally extreme claims by downstream states that the upstream state
has no right to draw water out.7 In fact, in Kansas v. Colorado itself, the Court
confronted two differing water rights regimes—prior appropriation in Colorado,
and riparian rights in Kansas—and had to determine the appropriate rule in a
dispute between two states whose laws would have produced very different results.
As the Court noted, “[i]f the two states were absolutely independent nations [the
dispute] would be settled by treaty or by force.”8 But “[n]either of these ways
being practicable, it must be settled by decision of this court.”9 What resulted was
a very broad inquiry. As the Court explained in Nebraska v. Wyoming:
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical
and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas,
the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former—
these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative not
an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem
of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which
must be made.10

Role of State Law
This brief history on the Court’s equitable apportionment jurisprudence
provides some background to the question regarding the role of state law—as
well as to the intervention and bifurcation questions discussed below. The prior
cases did not definitively address the degree to which, within this federal common
law exercise of equitable apportionment, state law may be taken into account.
In the South Carolina v. North Carolina case, South Carolina argued that state
law permits and other authorizations previously granted by North Carolina to
its water users were irrelevant because they would be overridden by whatever
apportionment the Court might make as a matter of federal common law. But
6
See id. at 98, 117 (discussing Colorado’s “extreme contention” and ultimately framing its
holding in terms of an “equitable division of benefits”).
7

See id.

8

Id. at 98.

9

Id.

325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945); see also Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1944)
(“[I]n determining whether one state is using, or threatening to use, more than its equitable share of
the benefits of a stream, all the factors which create equities in favor of one state or the other must
be weighed . . . .”).
10
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this approach overlooks the possibility of state law expectations as a factor that
the Court might consider as part of its federal common law analysis. In some
cases, the Court has looked to state law as the federal common law rule in the
case—for example, where both states recognize the same state law water rights
rules and the Court determines that following those rules is the most fair and
equitable course. This has occurred with some regularity in cases where both State
parties follow the rule of prior appropriation.11 State law also plays an indirect
role where state law rights or other interests or uses are considered as part of the
equitable apportionment analysis.12 The Court consistently has held that state law
and settled water uses authorized by state law are to be considered and weighed,
as the circumstances require.
In light of these precedents and the broad reach of the equitable
apportionment analysis, I concluded that state-created rights and interests,
including authorizations previously granted under North Carolina law, could
not be entirely disregarded in any equitable apportionment. For example, “the
extent of established uses” and “the damage to upstream areas as compared to the
benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former” are among
the factors that the Court considers.13 Indeed, the Court likely would consider
existing rights of water users under North Carolina law to transfer water from
the Catawba for use by their customers and citizens and the degree to which such
users have operated in reliance upon the continued existence of those state law
rights. In sum, state law ultimately would play a role even in a determination of
rights under federal common law.

Intervention
Another key issue that arose in the South Carolina v. North Carolina case was
whether three non-state parties should be allowed to intervene. This issue ultimately
was decided by the Court, which allowed two of the three parties to intervene.
Duke Energy was one such party.14 Duke claimed that it had an interest separate
from the interests of the States by virtue of its FERC license and its operation of
power plants both north and south of the border, including a significant reservoir
at the border at Lake Wylie where water from Duke’s plant would have to be
regulated in order to give effect to any equitable apportionment decree that
ultimately was entered in the case.15 Duke also claimed that it had a significant
11
See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183–84 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. at 617–18; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 470 (1922).
12
See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670–71 (1931) (observing that an
equitable apportionment analysis depends “upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the
contending States and all other relevant facts . . . .”).
13

Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 618.

14

South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 866–67 (2010).

15

Id. at 866.
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stake in the controversy by virtue of the pending FERC proceedings relating to its
relicensing application, which Duke argued reflected a comprehensive agreement
among constituencies that could be undermined by the relief sought by one or
both of the parties.16 Finally, Duke contended that the terms of its current and
future licenses would be crucial to any consideration by the Court of whether and
how equitably to apportion the Catawba River.17
The second intervenor permitted to join the case was the Catawba River
Water Supply Project (CRWSP)—a joint venture between units of government
of North Carolina and South Carolina.18 One of the two participants in CRWSP
was Union County, North Carolina, which was authorized under section 143215.22L(a)(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes, to transfer up to five
million gallons per day from the Catawba.19
The third proposed intervenor in the dispute was the City of Charlotte,
North Carolina, which was a beneficiary of one of the inter-basin transfers to
which South Carolina objected, and which allowed Charlotte’s power facility to
transfer up to thirty-three million gallons per day.20
Ultimately, a divided Court, with Justice Alito writing, permitted Duke and
CRWSP to intervene, but denied intervention status to Charlotte.21 The Court
rejected the argument—advanced by South Carolina and by the Chief Justice in
dissent—that intervention never should be allowed in interstate water disputes. 22
On the other hand, the Court emphasized that due respect must be given to
the “sovereign dignity” of the party states, such that when a State is “‘a party to
a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest,’ it is parens patriae and ‘must be
deemed to represent all [of ] its citizens.’”23 With this principle in mind, the Court
followed the test previously announced in New Jersey v. New York: “An intervenor

16

Id. at 866–67.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene and File
Answer at 12, South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 138, Original), 2007
WL 6831124.
17

18

South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 864.

See id. at 859, 864–65 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.22L(a)(1) (2007)). The
Court referenced the allegation in South Carolina’s complaint that the North Carolina “statute
‘grandfathers’ a 5 mgd transfer by the CRWSP.” Id. at 859; see also Brief of the State of South
Carolina in Support of Its Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 6, South Carolina v. North
Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854 (2010) (No. 138, Original), 2007 WL 3283683 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 143-215.22I(b), (i) (2006) (repealed 2007) (current version at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-215.22L(b),
(p) (2010))).
19

20

South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. at 859–61, 867–68.

21

Id. at 858–59.

22

See id. at 869 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

23

Id. at 863 (majority opinion) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1953)).
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whose state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling
interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens
and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly represented by the state.”24
Within that framework, the Court easily dispatched the City of Charlotte,
the interests of which the Court found would be represented by North Carolina,
which had an interest in ensuring sufficient water for Charlotte and other North
Carolina municipalities.25
As for Duke, the Court found that it had demonstrated “powerful interests
that likely will shape the outcome of this litigation.”26 The Court emphasized that
the manner in which an equitable apportionment is resolved is not a formulaic
process but must take into account numerous factors, including:
[P]hysical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water
in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas,
[and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits
to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.27
With these interests as background, the Court concluded that Duke’s interests
in operating its power plants, and its function of regulating the flow of much of
the river, gave it a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation. The Court
also agreed with Duke that it had a strong interest in protecting the negotiated
outcome of its relicensing proceeding. The Court noted that Duke’s FERC
license “regulates the very subject matter in dispute: the river’s minimum flow
into South Carolina.”28 The Court also found that the negotiated relicensing
agreement “represents the full consensus of 70 parties from both States regarding
the appropriate minimum continuous flow of Catawba River water into South
Carolina under a variety of natural conditions and, in times of drought, the
conservation measures to be taken by entities that withdraw water from the
Catawba River”—factors that the Court concluded “undeniably are relevant
to any ‘just and equitable apportionment’ of the Catawba River.”29 The Court
concluded that these interests should be represented and taken into account

24

Id. (quoting New Jersey, 345 U.S. at 373).

25

Id. at 867–68.

26

Id. at 866.

Id. (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
27

28

Id.

29

Id. at 866–67 (citation omitted).
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in the litigation, and that neither state party was in a position to represent
those interests.30
The Court also permitted CRWSP to intervene because, as a bi-state
entity, its interests would not be adequately represented by either party. The
Court reasoned:
The CRWSP is an unusual municipal entity, established as a
joint venture with the encouragement of regulatory authorities
in both States and designed to serve the increasing water needs
of Union County, North Carolina, and Lancaster County, South
Carolina. It has an advisory board consisting of representatives
from both counties, draws its revenues from its bistate sales, and
operates infrastructure and assets that are owned by both counties
as tenants-in-common. We are told that approximately 100,000
individuals in each State receive their water from the CRWSP
and that “roughly half ” of the CRWSP’s total withdrawals of
water from the Catawba River go to South Carolina consumers.
It is difficult to conceive of a more purely bistate entity.31
Accordingly, the Court found that CRWSP’s interests would not be represented
adequately by either state.32
Four Justices dissented from the Court’s ruling allowing the two
interventions—the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.
They argued that original jurisdiction is intended for resolution of state sovereign
claims, not private claims, and that due to the uniquely sovereign nature of water
disputes, intervention should rarely, if ever, be allowed in such disputes.33 The
interests of citizens in such disputes, the dissent reasoned, necessarily derive
from the rights of the state—a principle that holds true regardless of whether
the state will advocate a particular party’s interest in the dispute. The dissent also
was concerned about the practical consequences of opening the door to private
intervention in water disputes:
It is hard to see how the arguments the Court accepts today
could not also be pressed by countless other water users in either
North or South Carolina. Under the Court’s analysis, I see no
practical limitation on the number of citizens, as such, who
would be entitled to be made parties. To the extent intervention

30

Id. at 867.

31

Id. at 864 (citation omitted).

32

Id. at 865.

33

Id. at 871 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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is allowed for some private entities with interests in the water,
others who also have an interest will feel compelled to intervene
as well—and we will be hard put to refuse them. An equitable
apportionment action will take on the characteristics of an
interpleader case, with all those asserting interests in the limited
supply of water jostling for their share like animals at a water
hole. And we will find ourselves in a quandary whereby we must
opt either to pick and choose arbitrarily among similarly situated
litigants or to devote truly enormous portions of our energies to
original matters.34
The division in the Court on the intervention question highlights some
continued difficulty in defining the Court’s role in resolving interstate water
disputes. The majority of Justices emphasized the multi-faceted nature of the
exercise, and the numerous factors that need to be taken into account in resolving
interstate water disputes. Equally appropriate, the dissenting Justices emphasized
the sovereign nature of each state’s interest, and the importance of resolving such
matters at the sovereign level, rather than turning original actions into global
water adjudications akin to intrastate disputes resolved at the state level and
involving all interested parties.

Bifurcation
Another issue that arose in South Carolina v. North Carolina was whether the
liability issues in the case should be tried in two phases. In initial case management
proceedings, both State parties favored such a bifurcation—the concept being that
the initial trial could test the sufficiency of South Carolina’s threshold showing of
injury, and, if such injury were shown, the case could proceed to the merits. This
concept was memorialized in the initial Case Management Plan, but the parties
never were able to agree on the definition of the relevant phases. Following the
Supreme Court’s decision on intervention, the issue of bifurcation arose again,
with South Carolina for the first time arguing against any form of bifurcation at
the liability stage. This led to motion practice on the issue.
There is no special rule governing bifurcation in Supreme Court original cases.
Supreme Court Rule 17.2 allows the Court in original cases to use the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as “guides” in appropriate cases. Because a proposed
bifurcation of a case for trial raises essentially the same procedural and timing
considerations in an original case in this Court as it does in cases originating in
the district courts, federal district court cases involving Rule 42(b) bifurcation
provided a useful precedent. In those cases, the principal question on a motion
for bifurcation of liability is whether the case can be resolved more efficiently

34

Id. at 874–75 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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with one trial or two. If, for example, there is a separate and case-dispositive issue
that, if resolved one way, would obviate a protracted trial on other liability issues,
then it makes sense to hold a short trial on the one issue with the expectation that
resolution of that issue may be all that is needed. If, by contrast, there is no clear
division between the posited “threshold” issue and the issues that would have to
be addressed in a second phase of trial, or if it is not clear what resolution of the
first phase, if any, would obviate the second, then bifurcation may in fact prolong
the ultimate resolution of the case because it may require certain issues to be tried
or presented twice. Procedurally, the burden generally is on the party seeking to
bifurcate to show why such a procedure is more efficient than a unitary trial.35 In
addition, although there are numerous precedents for holding separate trials on
liability and damages, or on compensatory and punitive damages, there is far less
support for bifurcating the phases of a liability determination.36
Ultimately, the result was that the case would proceed without bifurcation—
despite the theoretical prospect that some form of bifurcation might speed up the
resolution of the case. Although the parties initially had agreed on the concept
of bifurcation—and even on the existence of a “threshold” question of South
Carolina’s injury that could be decided before other issues—the parties never
agreed on the definition and scope of the two proposed phases. Their differences
were not merely issues of wording, but rather reflected fundamentally different
views as to South Carolina’s burden of proof, both in the initial phase and in
the action generally. For example, during the period when South Carolina was
advocating a bifurcated trial, it offered a narrow view of the showing it would
have to make to survive Phase I—namely, that the water flowing to its side of the
border was insufficient to meet its needs, and that uses by North Carolina, viewed
in the aggregate, were the cause of that insufficient flow. By contrast, North
Carolina contended that Phase I would include consideration of not only the
reduced flow and the aggregate uses by North Carolina, but also a host of other

Generally speaking, the procedure is to decide all issues in a single trial. See Willemijn
Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (D. Del. 1989).
Bifurcation is “the exception, not the rule.” Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp.
113, 114 (E.D. La. 1992). A party seeking bifurcation must justify departing from the unitary trial
model, usually by showing that a bifurcated trial would be more efficient or avoid prejudice. See,
e.g., Rodin Properties–Shore Mall, N.V. v. Cushman & Wakefield of Pa., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 709,
721 (D.N.J. 1999) (citations omitted); THK Am., Inc. v. NSK Co., 151 F.R.D. 625, 631–32 (N.D.
Ill. 1993).
35

Separate trials on liability and damages can create efficiencies because the damages issues
may involve different evidence and do not need to be decided unless liability is proven. See Angelo
v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993). Another common practice
is to hold a separate trial on punitive damages after the main trial on liability and compensatory
damages. In that instance, the objective is to avoid prejudice to the defendant that would result from
allowing punitive damages evidence—such as evidence of the defendant’s net worth—at the liability
and compensatory damages stage.
36
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issues, including whether other factors—such as natural drought conditions,
or inefficient usage by South Carolina—caused or contributed to South
Carolina’s injury.
The parties also did not agree on what would happen at the end of Phase I.
South Carolina contended that, if it made the initial showing of injury required
by Phase I, the only question for Phase II would be the shaping of an appropriate
decree, and it would be in that context that the Court would engage in any
equitable balancing of the relative values of each state’s water uses. In other words,
the minimal showing called for under its definition of Phase I would entitle
South Carolina to a decree—the only question then being how the decree would
be fashioned in light of the competing equities. North Carolina, by contrast,
appeared to view Phase I as being merely a “threshold,” or jurisdictional, phase
through which the parties would pass before proceeding to the merits of the case
in Phase II. Under this view, if South Carolina failed to make the “threshold”
showing of injury in Phase I, the Court would lack jurisdiction to proceed further.
If South Carolina made the requisite Phase I showing, Phase II would involve a
more fulsome inquiry into whether an equitable decree was warranted, including
by balancing the relative values of water uses by the two states. Only after that
broad inquiry resulted in a finding of liability, or entitlement, would the Court
proceed to the Phase II question posited by South Carolina—the shaping of an
equitable decree.
At the end of the day, and despite the parties’ initial agreement that there
could be a “threshold” issue of injury that, however defined, might be severed
and decided separately at the outset of the trial, there was not a sound basis for
bifurcating the liability stage of the case. Supreme Court precedent made clear
that the liability inquiry in such a case must consider all relevant factors, and
made it difficult, if not impossible, to sever a single issue or set of issues that
could be singled out for early trial and disposition. Nor did the Court’s prior
cases support the existence of a separate “threshold” requirement of injury on
the part of the complaining State without which the Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the controversy. Although there were several cases in which
the Court declined to enter an equitable decree due to an absence of a concrete
showing of injury, those rulings were made after a full trial, including, in most
cases, consideration of relative values of each state’s existing and proposed uses.37
Finally, bifurcating the injury inquiry from the rest of the proceedings would not
have served the interests of judicial economy. There would be a high probability
of overlap between the question of South Carolina’s injury and North Carolina’s
equitable uses of the Catawba, and thus the proposed phases likely would “involve

37
See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393–400 (1943); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521–26 (1906).
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extensive proof and substantially the same facts or witnesses as the other issues in
the case[ ].”38 When that is the case, “there is little efficiency to be gained” from
bifurcation.39

Conclusion
Our Constitution entrusted the Supreme Court with the weighty role of
resolving disputes between states—a device intended to avoid the prospect of
warring sovereigns within our unique federalist system of government, but at the
same time to respect the dignity of each sovereign state. For those reasons, original
cases frequently involve contested issues that not only are of deep concern to the
states involved, but also implicate the Court’s constitutional role in resolving such
disputes. Resolution of such issues is a crucial, if frequently overlooked, part of
the Court’s jurisprudence.

38

9A Charles Alan Wright

et al.,

Federal Practice

and

Procedure § 2388 (3d ed.

2010).
39

Ortiz v. Pearson, 88 F. Supp. 2d 151, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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